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Lifelines are essential infrastructures for human activities and the economic development of a region. Lifelines 
vulnerability reduction is an actual question, particularly with reference to NaTech events, like earthquakes. In 
this regard, worldwide past seismic experiences revealed heavy damages to NG distribution networks. It is 
therefore essential to perform seismic risk assessment of NG buried pipelines systems with the aim to identify 
potential criticalities and avoid significant consequences. For such reasons, this work illustrates the proposal 
of a probabilistic framework for seismic risk assessment of NG lifelines. The proposed procedure is 
subsequently applied to a specific case study in Italy to highlight its feasibility. 
1.  Introduction  
The gas distribution network is a critical infrastructure and its failure can cause damage to structures and 
injury to people. Despite the low number of accidents that occurred in the transportation of natural gas (Center 
for Chemical Process Safety, 1995; TNO, 1999), some serious incidents have confirmed that the 
transportation of hazardous materials has the potential to pose a high risk to the population.  
Two particularly relevant pipeline incidents occurred in 2004: the explosion of a major underground high 
pressure natural gas pipeline in Ghislenghien industrial park, near Ath, about 50 km (30 miles) south-west of 
Brussels, Belgium (HInt Dossier, 2005) and a pipeline rupture (ammonia) near Kingman, Kansas 
(http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/fulltext/PAB0702.htm). 
The development of tools both for the risk assessment and the performance evaluation of preventive and 
protective measures in the transportation of hazardous materials is thus an issue of primary concern (Vianello 
and Maschio 2014). 
The safety aspects of pipelines conveying dangerous substances are not covered in specific EU regulations. 
It must be highlighted that the Seveso III Directive (DIRECTIVE 2012/18/EU) aims to prevent major accidents 
at industrial facilities, whereas transport by pipeline is not included. 
In fact, the same kind of accidental scenarios, in terms of frequency and severity, may occur both in fixed 
plants and in transportation systems. Additionally transport accidents may occur close to, and sometimes 
within, densely populated areas (Fabiano et al. 2002). 
Several of such studies pointed out that the risk related to transportation activities is comparable or even more 
critical than the risk due to fixed installations. 
A natural gas pipeline is designed to allow gas transport from locations situated at large distances. The 
characteristic size of a gas transmission pipeline can range up to several hundred centimeters in diameter and 
several thousand kilometers in length. The pipeline may cross both rural and heavily population areas. Failure 
of the pipeline can lead to various outcomes, some of which can pose a significant threat to people and 
buildings in the immediate proximity of the failure location.  
Natural hazards in addition can seriously affect functionality of pipelines, causing local failures. In particular in 
areas prone to seismic risk, buried pipelines can be subject to permanent ground motions or transitory strong 
ground shakings which can lead to damages and consequent release of transportated substances. 
Probabilistic seismic risk analyses need to be performed for evaluating effects of earthquake scenarios 
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occurrence on a pipeline system, taking into account seismological and geotechnical characteristics of the 
environment in which the system is located and structural behavior of each pipeline segment. Seismic 
response is usually defined through fragility functions, which represent exceedance probabilities of having a 
series of possible damage states conditional to a specific intensity measure value. In this work, a proposal of a 
probabilistic framework for seismic risk assessment of buried pipelines systems located in areas prone to 
seismic hazard is briefly described. 
2. Seismic hazard modeling 
In a classical Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) (Cornell 1968) it is important to take into account 
an appropriate seismogenic model. Different types of seismogenic sources can be adopted: in the last 
decades, seismic hazard was mainly assessed through the use of area source models (Giardini 1999). 
Seismogenic zones are designed with the assumption that seismicity occurs anywhere within each zone. The 
definition of the boundaries of seismogenic zones was based on seismological, tectonical and geological 
issues. The estimation of seismic activity rates was based on the construction and subsequent statistical 
analysis of historical earthquake catalogues. Usually the distribution of events adopted is the classical 
Gutenberg-Richter (G-R):  
 
logଵ଴ λ(M) = a − b ∙ M     (1) 
 
where M is the earthquake magnitude, λ is the annual rate of earthquakes of a given magnitude M and a, b 
are coefficients derived from statistical regression analysis on historical catalogue data. 
Once defined a set of potential earthquake scenarios, ground motion is modeled with Ground Motion 
Prediction Equations (GMPEs), that provide a probabilistic distribution of a given intensity measure conditional 
to earthquake intensity, point-to-source distance and other parameters related to specific geological features. 
GMPEs are usually calibrated through regression analyses on data recorded in past events. The general 
expression of a GMPE relationship is:  
 
logଵ଴ IM୧୨ = f൫M୧, R୧୨, θ୧୨൯ + σ୆ ν୧ + σ୛ε୧୨                 (2) 
 
where IMij is the intensity measure of interest for a site j far Rij from the source i during an event of magnitude 
Mi, θij encloses geological conditions, σBνi represents the residual inter-event variability whereas σWεij is the 
intra-event residual. The νi and εij terms are random variables normally distributed with mean value μ = 0 and 
standard deviation σ = 1, whereas σB and σW are respectively the inter- and intra-event standard deviation 
values. Spatial correlation models of intra-event residuals available in literature have been mostly estimated 
using single non-European earthquakes, for which many records were available from dense seismic networks 
(see Boore et al. 2003; Goda and Hong 2008). It has been observed how the coefficient of correlation ρjk 
between intra-event residuals calculated in j and k sites separated by a distance hjk decreases with increasing 
mutual distance values. The correlation coefficient is therefore usually a function of the inter-site distance hjk, 
as follows: 
 
ρ୨୩൫h୨୩൯ = eିଷ୦ౠౡ/ୠ                 (3) 
 
where b represents the inter-site distance at which the spatial correlation is practically lost. In the European 
strong motion datasets, no dense observations of single earthquakes are available from which reliable 
estimates of spatial correlation of intensity measures can be obtained. Therefore, strong motion records from 
multiple events and regions collected in the European Strong-motion Database and the Italian Accelerometric 
Archive were merged aiming to derive a unique correlation model (Esposito and Iervolino 2011). The use of a 
correlation function rjk(hjk) exclusively dependent on the inter-site distance hjk for the simulation of the spatial 
correlation, requires the following assumptions: 
- intra-event residuals for a set of spatially distributed sites must follow a multivariate Gaussian distribution; 
- Gaussian random field must be second-order stationary; 
- GRF must be isotropic. 
Under these assumptions, a decomposition approach can be adopted for the simulation of spatially correlated 
ground motion fields. A random field of residuals Y following a multivariate Gaussian distribution, can be 
defined by a set of y1, y2, … yN residual values for N sites, generated as follows: 
 
Y = μ + LZ                 (4) 
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where Z is a vector of z1, z2, … zN values following a Gaussian standardized distribution, μ is a vector 
representing the mean value of the residuals (herein assumed μ  = 0) and L is a lower triangular matrix 
obtained by the Cholesky factorization, such that LLT = C, where C is the correlation matrix defined positive as 
follows: 
 
C = ൦
1 ρ(hଵଶ)
ρ(hଶଵ) 1
⋮
ρ(h୒ଵ)
⋮
ρ(h୒ଶ)
⋯ ρ(hଵ୒)
⋯ ρ(hଶ୒)⋱
⋯
⋮
1
൪                 (5) 
 
and rjk(hjk) is the correlation coefficient between residual values obtained in pair of sites with a inter-site 
distance equal to hjk. 
3. Seismic fragility and consequence modeling 
Pipelines systems can be subject to failures if located in areas prone to seismic hazard. In such cases, 
release is a direct consequence of structural failure pipes and other elements drift- or acceleration- sensitive.  
Seismic vulnerability of gas pipes is defined through fragility curves that represent exceedance probability 
values for a set of possible damage states as a function of the intensity measure value to which an element is 
subject during an earthquake. Focusing on the loss of hazardous material, structural damage states are 
converted in terms of release states (RS). For pipelines three different RSs are taken into account according 
to Lanzano et al. (2003) namely: 
 
- RS0 (no damage), in which damage do not cause any loss of containment; 
- RS1 (release from hole), where structural damage involves few loss of containment or a time-
distributed; 
- RS2 (catastrophic rupture), representing a structural collapse that leads to the release of large 
amounts of fluids in a short time-window.  
 
So given an intensity value at a pipe segment it is possible to calculate through the use of loss of containment 
fragility curves the related RS probabilities. A specific event tree is adopted for pipelines components for the 
assessment of release consequences as shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Event tree scheme adopted for pipelines components.  
 
For each specific consequence event it is possible to define a mean consequence radius which identifies the 
area affected in case of pipe failure. The consequence radius values estimated as function of the fluid 
contained in the pipe and its geometrical characteristics can be aggregated in a consequence indicator 
represented by the weighted sum of each value multiplied by its respective final probability of occurrence. In 
such way, it is possible to highlight which parts of a pipeline system located in an area prone to seismic 
hazard are more exposed to potential ruptures caused by quake occurrence. 
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4. Case study 
A probabilistic seismic risk analysis is performed on a pipe belonging to the Italian National gas pipeline 
system with the aim to identify the most exposed segments of the pipe in case of occurrence of a specific 
earthquake scenario, stocastically simulated via a set of ground motion fields. 
The analysis is focused on the pipe #048, located in the North-Eastern Italy, in the Friuli Venezia Giulia region. 
The area is highly prone to seismic hazard and was recently subject to the Mw 6.4 1976 Friuli earthquake. The 
aim of this study is to assess consequences of the potential recurrence of the 1976 earthquake on the pipe 
#048 from Malborghetto to Flaibano, one of the most important pipes, close to the national import point 
located in the municipality of Tarvisio. 
 
 
Figure 2: The Italian national gas pipeline network and the analysed Malborghetto-Flaibano pipe #048.  
Table 1 lists main input data needed for defining consequence radius values calculated and reported in Table 
2, in relation to possible consequences as illustrated in the event-tree diagram of Figure 1. 
Table 1:  Main input data considered in the analysed case study. 
Parameter Input field Value 
Material Discharge material Methane 
Process conditions 
Temperature 20°C 
Pressure 70 bar 
Diameter 1200 mm 
Flow 294 kg/s 
Location Elevation -1.5 m 
 
A set of 100 spatially correlated ground motion fields were generated as described above for the stochastic 
simulation of peak ground velocity (PGV) spatial distribution generated by the Mw 6.4 1976 Friuli earthquake. 
The GMPE of Bindi et al. (2011) was adopted for the characterization of the fields: Figure 3 shows, as 
example, ground motion field #12.  
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 Figure 3: Representation of the Mw 6.4 1976 Friuli earthquake peak ground velocity field #12. 
For each PGV field structural damages to the different parts of the pipe #048 have been assessed through 
fragility curves of Lanzano et al. (2013) in terms of release states and associated probability values. 
Consequence radius listed in Table 2 were subsequently weighed with probability values derived from fragility 
curves and the event tree diagram illustrated in Figure 1 leading to define an average consequence radius 
adopted as indicator criterion for the identification of the pipe segments mostly affected in case of Friuli 
earthquake scenario recurrence. Figure 4 shows the 95th percentile envelope result, representing in green 
average consequence radius values lower than 200m, in yellow values in the range 200 – 400 m and in red 
the ones higher than 400m.  
Table 2:  Consequence radius associated to different possible types of release. 
Type of release Jet fire (37.5 KW/m2) VCE (Explosion 0.3 bar) Flash fire (LFL) 
RS1 - Release from hole 137 341 1383 
RS2 - Catastrophic rupture 65 341 1572 
 
 
Figure 4: 95th percentile average consequence radius for the pipe #048. 
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5. Conclusions 
In this work, the proposal of a probabilistic framework for seismic risk assessment of buried pipeline systems 
located in areas prone to seismic hazard was proposed. Seismic hazard modeling coupled with a description 
of pipelines seismic vulnerability in terms of release states lead to estimate potential consequences in terms of 
network release scenarios in case of quake occurrence. In particular, for each pipe segment release 
probabilities were assessed through fragility functions, according to the specific level of shaking induced by 
the quake, thus leading to different values along the same pipes. Then, event tree analysis allowed to quantify 
probabilities of occurrence of the different possible consequences of pipe structural failure. The proposed 
approach was tested through the simulation of the effects on a pipe belonging to the Italian National gas 
distribution system located in northeast Italy. Once defined a probable earthquake scenario on the basis of the 
recent seismicity of the area, a set of 100 spatially correlated PGV fields were simulated and for each of them 
consequences were assessed. Results allowed to identify segments of the pipe mostly affected in case of 
scenario occurrence. 
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